Unshackling the Sahel: A Critical Analysis of Post-Colonial Governance, Military Coups, and the Role of the Sahel Coalition

Introduction

The Sahel region of West Africa, stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east, has in recent decades become synonymous with chronic instability, conflict, and governance crises. Encompassing countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, this semi-arid belt straddles the boundary between the Sahara and the savannah, and holds immense geopolitical significance. It acts as both a buffer against the spread of extremism to coastal West Africa and a frontline for counterterrorism efforts mounted by international actors, notably France, the United States, and the United Nations.

Yet, despite extensive foreign military and development assistance, the region has remained mired in escalating violence, poverty, displacement, and state fragility. Between 2020 and 2023, a wave of military coups swept across the Sahel, toppling civilian governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These coups, each of which cited rising jihadist insurgencies, corruption, and the failures of Western-backed democratic regimes, have dramatically reshaped the political landscape. Although condemned by the international community, particularly by ECOWAS and Western governments, these military takeovers were met with surprising levels of domestic support. Public celebrations in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey signaled widespread disillusionment with democratic institutions that had, in the eyes of many, become vehicles for elite self-enrichment and foreign dependency rather than agents of national development or sovereignty.

The prevailing Western narrative portrays these coups as democratic backsliding, threatening regional stability and international norms. However, a more nuanced interpretation reveals that these events may also be symptomatic of a broader structural failure: the inability of post-colonial governance systems, often shaped by former colonial powers and perpetuated by domestic elites, to deliver security, equity, and sovereignty. In this light, the Sahel's military coups can be read not merely as disruptions, but as responses to decades of failed reforms, unfulfilled development promises, and growing anti-colonial and Pan-Africanist sentiment.

Historical and Political Context

Colonial Legacies and French Influence

The Sahel’s political fragility is rooted in its colonial past. France’s administrative model focused on indirect rule and economic extraction, leaving behind weak state institutions upon independence in the 1960s (Bamidele, 2016). Post-colonial states were burdened with artificial borders, underdeveloped economies, and military structures modeled after the colonial order.

Despite formal independence, France maintained deep ties through the Françafrique policy, leveraging military bases, currency control via the CFA franc, and privileged business interests. This created a class of political elites more accountable to Paris than to their own populations (Fais, 2024). French involvement in military operations, such as Operation Serval (2013) and Operation Barkhane (2014–2022), was perceived by many as neocolonial intervention, especially as insecurity worsened despite foreign troops on the ground (Nzima et al., 2025).

Patterns of Governance After Independence

Post-independence governance in the Sahel was characterized by cycles of military and civilian rule. While democratic reforms were introduced in the 1990s, weak institutions and patronage networks persisted. Political parties often lacked ideological grounding, operating instead as vehicles for elite interests. Corruption scandals, electoral manipulation, and ineffective service delivery eroded public trust in civilian governments (Haruna, 2022).

Causes of the Recent Coups

1. Failed Democratic Governance and Disillusionment

Democracy in the Sahel has failed to deliver security or prosperity for large segments of the population. In Mali, years of instability following the 2012 rebellion and jihadist takeover of the north exposed the government’s inability to assert national control. Burkina Faso’s elected leaders failed to stop the spread of jihadism beyond its northern provinces. In Niger, while President Bazoum was lauded internationally, his domestic popularity was limited, particularly among marginalized communities and the military (Ojewale, 2024).

These conditions created a vacuum of legitimacy, prompting military takeovers. The coups were framed not as anti-democratic, but as necessary “corrections” of failed leadership.

2. Escalating Security Crises and State Collapse

By 2023, over 60% of Burkina Faso’s territory was outside state control. Mali’s rural areas were dominated by JNIM and ISGS, and Niger’s western and southeastern borders saw frequent cross-border attacks. Despite billions spent on international military interventions, insecurity worsened, with over 10,000 civilians killed annually in the Sahel between 2020 and 2023 (Fais, 2024).

National armies were demoralized, under-equipped, and sometimes complicit in atrocities. This gave credence to coup leaders who claimed civilian governments had “lost the war.” Many citizens viewed military regimes as better equipped—politically and tactically—to confront the jihadist threat.

3. Perceived Neocolonialism and Foreign Military Presence

A significant driver of anti-establishment sentiment has been the enduring influence of former colonial powers. In Mali and Burkina Faso, France maintained military bases and intelligence operations. Critics argue that French involvement prioritized the protection of French interests—like uranium in Niger or gold in Mali—over real development or local sovereignty (Kazeem, 2024).

France’s counterinsurgency campaigns, particularly Operation Barkhane, were perceived as failures, despite massive troop deployment. As France was pushed out, Russian actors, including the Wagner Group, filled the vacuum. The optics of African militaries rejecting Western troops while inviting alternative partners fed into a rising wave of Pan-African nationalism and anti-Western sentiment (Nzima et al., 2025).

4. Rise of Pan-African and Anti-Western Sentiment

A new Pan-African political narrative is being forged in the Sahel. Youth-led movements in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey champion slogans like “France dégage!” (France, get out!) and celebrate national flags over foreign alliances. Military leaders in these countries have deliberately harnessed nationalist rhetoric, positioning themselves as defenders of sovereignty.

Social media influencers, musicians, and intellectuals have contributed to this ideological shift, framing the coups as part of a “second independence.” This movement challenges not only Western dominance but also the post-colonial elite structures that maintained it (Chidozie et al., 2024).

Post-Coup Developments

Shifts in Foreign Alliances

All three countries have expelled French forces and MINUSMA, seeking new alliances with Russia, Turkey, and China. Mali and Burkina Faso are cooperating with the Russian Wagner Group, while Niger is negotiating security pacts with Iran and Algeria. These shifts reflect a recalibration of foreign policy aimed at reclaiming sovereignty (Ojewale, 2024).

China’s role, though less visible militarily, is growing economically. It has invested in Sahelian infrastructure, digital surveillance systems, and minerals, often without imposing governance conditions, a stark contrast to Western donors.

Governance and Institutional Reform

Post-coup administrations have made mixed progress. Mali's government has restructured its military and launched new offensives against jihadists. Burkina Faso’s junta created a Patriotic Mobilization Office and recruited tens of thousands of civilian auxiliaries. Niger’s new rulers pledged to "decolonize" institutions but have yet to deliver major reforms (Fais, 2024).

However, none of these regimes has restored full civilian oversight, and delays in promised democratic transitions raise concerns about authoritarian drift. Press freedom has declined, and opposition parties operate under constraints. The coups may have addressed short-term legitimacy crises, but they risk entrenching militarized governance.

Security Outcomes and Public Services

Security remains tenuous. While there are reports of localized improvements in Mali and Burkina Faso, the overall threat from jihadists persists. Attacks on civilians and infrastructure continue, especially in rural areas. Public services such as schools, clinics, and courts remain non-functional in many regions (UNHCR, 2024).

That said, public perception has largely remained in favor of military rule, with many citizens expressing cautious optimism about increased autonomy and national pride (Nzima et al., 2025). In this sense, the psychological effects of asserting sovereignty have been as significant as any material gains.

The Sahel Coalition/Alliance

Origins and Objectives

Following their coups and shared disillusionment with ECOWAS, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. The alliance seeks collective defense, political solidarity, and joint action against terrorism. It emerged partly in response to threats of ECOWAS sanctions and military intervention in Niger (Kazeem, 2024).

The AES aims to coordinate security operations, share intelligence, and foster Pan-Africanist identity. Some view it as a political bloc to resist Western pressures; others see it as a platform for regional integration, independent of traditional institutions.

Member States and Supporters

AES currently includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, with informal support from Guinea and Algeria. Russia and Iran have provided diplomatic and military backing, while Turkey has supplied equipment. France and ECOWAS, by contrast, have labeled the alliance as illegitimate and destabilizing.

Performance and Criticisms

While symbolically powerful, the AES faces significant limitations. Coordination between its members remains ad hoc, and joint military operations have yet to demonstrate clear success. The exclusion of civil society, lack of economic integration plans, and absence of electoral timelines also raise questions about long-term sustainability (Darkwah & Everton, 2023).

Moreover, while AES may be asserting sovereignty, its reliance on alternative powers like Russia suggests a shift in dependency rather than true autonomy. Critics argue that external actors—regardless of origin—often pursue their own strategic interests, not those of the local population

Critical Analysis and Personal Position

Military regimes may offer short-term stability and symbolic victories, but they are not a sustainable alternative to inclusive, accountable governance. The coups in the Sahel highlight the failure of post-colonial democratic models to deliver development and security—but they should not be romanticized.

The Sahel Alliance, while promising in terms of regional solidarity, must move beyond militarism and embrace economic integration, institutional reform, and civil participation. Its future legitimacy hinges on whether it can evolve into a vehicle for grassroots-driven change or whether it will replicate the failures of ECOWAS and the African Union.

External actors must reassess their engagement. Rather than imposing top-down models, they should support locally driven initiatives, prioritize education and infrastructure, and respect the sovereignty of Sahelian nations. Without this, the region will remain caught in cycles of rebellion, repression, and reaction.

Conclusion

The military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are not isolated power grabs; they are symptomatic of a deeper malaise tied to failed governance, foreign dependency, and the unfulfilled promises of independence. The post-coup realignments reflect a strong desire for sovereignty and dignity—an unshackling of the Sahel from its post-colonial chains.

However, true liberation requires more than military uniforms and nationalist slogans. It demands functional institutions, transparent governance, and investment in human development. The Sahel stands at a crossroads: it can become a beacon of a new Pan-African future, or fall into another cycle of militarized stagnation.

References

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Nzima, D., Aliyu, M., Aki, H. M., & Moyo, G. (2025). Resurgence of Coups and Anti-French Sentiments in West Africa: A Review. Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-83868-2_17

Ojewale, O. (2024). Geopolitics and Terrorism in West Africa. Springer. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-031-25399-7_40-1.pdf