The Generals’ War in Sudan: Cracks and Challenges to African Peace

Introduction

Since April 2023, Sudan has been gripped by a conflict between the regular army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti.” In April 2025, the RSF established a parallel government, further fragmenting the country’s political and geographic integrity. In the face of this crisis, the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and regional institutions are being tested in their efforts to prevent the disintegration of the Sudanese state and to re-establish a sustainable peace process. This analysis explores the weaknesses of existing mechanisms and offers recommendations for conflict prevention and security sector reform on a continental scale.

Chronology of a Fratricidal War

On April 15, 2023, the RSF launched simultaneous attacks on regular army positions in Khartoum, North Khartoum, and Merowe in northern Sudan, igniting hostilities. In response, armored units loyal to the government under the command of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan fought back to protect the presidential palace and airport in the capital, resulting in intense urban clashes.

This war has its roots in the aftermath of the Sudanese revolution in December 2018, when mass protests erupted against the authoritarian rule of Omar al-Bashir, which had lasted more than three decades, and a severe economic crisis. In April 2019, the military—which already included RSF elements—overthrew al-Bashir, ushering in a brief period of democratic hope.

Under pressure from the African Union and Ethiopia, a joint Sovereignty Council made up of civilian and military representatives was established in August 2019, with elections planned for 2023. However, negotiations quickly broke down over the timeline for integrating the RSF into the army—some parties demanded ten years, others two—and over the position of RSF officers in the military hierarchy.

On October 25, 2021, General al-Burhan and his deputy Hemedti transformed the Council into a military junta by ousting civilians from all institutions. This move brought to light regional and tribal alliances, and the rift between the SAF and RSF became irreparable.

As weeks and months passed, Hemedti cemented his influence by establishing a parallel local government in Darfur. On April 15, 2025, he declared a rival government backed by a coalition of political parties and rebel groups, with the aim of challenging Khartoum’s authority and gaining international legitimacy.

The true cause of the April 2023 conflict was the deep disagreement over the RSF’s integration into the national army. This tension reflects a long-standing rivalry between the two leaders for full control over the country and its resources. Both sides rely on foreign support: the regular army receives military and financial aid from Egypt, while the RSF is backed by the United Arab Emirates.

A Devastating Humanitarian Situation

After more than a year of intense fighting, the army has regained control of the capital, Khartoum, including the airport, presidential palace, and key neighborhoods. RSF forces have retreated westward, toward Darfur and the border regions. While the conflict now shifts to peripheral areas, the capital lies in ruins.

In El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, fierce resistance is underway. Unlike other cities under RSF control, El Fasher remains in the hands of local forces cooperating with the regular army. The clashes here are particularly brutal, and the city stands as the last bastion against Hemedti’s advance in western Sudan.

RSF’s Parallel Government or the Breakup of Sudan

The Tasis Alliance, established in February in Nairobi, Kenya, formalized a coalition between RSF paramilitaries and political parties and civil society organizations under the name “Governing Council.” This body aims to gain political traction against the regular army’s government, which has been based in Port Sudan since the start of the war two years ago. The 31-member council, announced in a lavish ceremony in Nyala (South Darfur), is headed by Hemedti.

Appointed as vice president was Abdel Aziz Adam al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), which operates in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. The SPLM-N has long fought the Khartoum government and the janjaweed militias that emerged from it.

According to founding member Hasbelnabi Mahmoud, bringing the SPLM-N into the alliance is a major success. Hemedti is sending a clear message about the need to establish a secular and democratic state for all Sudanese.

Sudan: Cracks and Challenges in African Peace

Under the African Union’s framework, the Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was established with the 2002 Protocol to prevent, manage, and resolve crises. This protocol assigned responsibilities to the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, and the Continental Standby Force. Additionally, regional structures such as IGAD (East Africa), ECOWAS (West Africa), and ECCAS (Central Africa) are activated for mediation, peacekeeping, and targeted sanctions.

Early warning systems operate with locally gathered data; preventive diplomacy missions, roundtable discussions, and phased sanctions—including embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans—are used to encourage a return to negotiations.

However, the conflict in Sudan reveals the limitations of these mechanisms. The ousting of civilians in the October 2021 coup led to the politicization of transitional institutions, and the failure to integrate the RSF into the army exposed shortcomings in APSA’s commitment to security sector reform. The breakdown of coordination within IGAD following the generals’ split undermined regional mediation efforts, and the establishment of a parallel government in April 2025 resulted in territorial and institutional fragmentation.

Conclusion

For an effective peace, a binding framework that mandates the unification of rival armed forces, a clear timeline, and independent international monitoring are essential. The sustainable funding of regional early warning centers through autonomous analysts and satellite- and community-based data collection tools is also critical. Sanctions must be tied to automatic trigger mechanisms in response to agreement violations to maintain credibility. Peace processes must include all segments of society—civil society, women’s and youth organizations—to ensure that agreements extend beyond the military and political elites.

Sustainable peace in Africa will only be possible through operational cooperation between APSA and regional bodies, the strengthening of security sector reform, and the inclusive participation of all societal actors.

References

• Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). 2025. Conflict Watchlist 2025: Sudan. Erişim: 11 Temmuz 2025.

• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2025. Sudan emergency. UNHCR Data Portal. Erişim: 11 Temmuz 2025.

• United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 3 Temmuz 2025. Cholera outbreak escalates as Sudan health system crumbles. ReliefWeb. Erişim: 11 Temmuz 2025.

• United Nations Security Council. 8 Mart 2024. Adopting resolution 2724 (2024), Security Council calls for ceasefire in Sudan during Ramadan [Basın bildirisi SC/15615]. UN Press. Erişim: 11 Temmuz 2025.